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PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN THE GRAND JURY:
DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENTS PURSUANT TO THE
FEDERAL SUPERVISORY POWER
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has held that a federal indictment is presump-
tively valid.1 Thus, grand jury proceedings are substantially insulated
from judicial review.2 The federal courts, however, possess an inherent
supervisory power' that allows them to reach beyond the Constitution or
acts of Congress to establish and maintain civilized standards of proce-
dure and evidence.4 This power enables courts to dismiss indictments
when they find prosecutorial misconduct' to have occurred during grand
jury proceedings.6 The federal courts of appeals, however, disagree as to
whether a defendant, to justify dismissal, must prove that prosecutorial
misconduct prejudiced the grand jury's decision to indict.' Defendants
1. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956); infra note 67 and accom-
panying text.
2. See 2 S. Beale & W. Bryson, Grand Jury Law and Practice § 10:01, at 2 (1986).
3. See generally infra notes 50-78 and accompanying text (discussing the supervisory
power).
By definition, supervisory power rulings apply only in federal proceedings. See Beale,
Reconsidering Supervisory Powers in Criminal Caser Constitutional and Statutory Limits
on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1433, 1434 (1984). The super-
visory power of the federal courts rests upon the assumption that the federal courts repre-
sent the appropriate tribunals to exercise the overall responsibility for developing and
supervising the implementation of the rules of federal procedure, particularly in criminal
cases. See id at 1435. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), is generally re-
garded as the first decision to recognize federal courts' supervisory power. Soon thereaf-
ter, lower federal courts began to exercise their own supervisory power. See Beale, supra,
at 1433. The earliest case decided solely upon the court's supervisory power was Helwig
v. United States, 162 F.2d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 1947). See Beale, supra, at 1433 n.5.
4. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943).
5. Prosecutorial misconduct is anything that prevents the accused from receiving a
fair trial. See D. Nissman & E. Hagen, The Prosecution Function 7 (1982). See also infra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing the types of grand jury misconduct).
6. See, eg., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 83 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 942 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1193 (1985); United States v. Mitchell, 572 F. Supp. 709, 713 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 736
F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).
7. Compare United States v. Kouba, 822 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1987) (indictment
may be dismissed only upon a showing of actual prejudice to the accused) and United
States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982)
(same) and United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1978) (same) with
United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983) (dismissal without requiring a
showing of actual prejudice) and United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir.
1979) (same).
For a discussion of the prejudice requirement, see infra notes 104-122 and accompany-
ing text.
Inn
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usually raise this issue during' or after trial.9 Therefore, few courts have
addressed the question of whether a defendant must prove that
prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced him in order to justify a court's dis-
missal of an indictment pursuant to a pre-trial motion. 10 The Supreme
Court has explicitly left this issue open."'
This Note examines the question of whether a defendant must prove
prejudice when, prior to trial, he raises the issue of prosecutorial miscon-
duct in the grand jury proceedings. Part I looks at the roles of the prose-
cutor and the grand jury and the interaction between the two. Part II
discusses the federal courts' use of their supervisory powers to dismiss
indictments. Part III examines the conflicting views of the courts of ap-
8. See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 68 (1986); United States v.
Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1232, 1233 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Kouba, 822 F.2d 768, 769-70 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3282 (1986);
United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1245-46 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837
(1985).
10. In the past year a few courts have faced pre-trial motions for dismissal. One such
case was United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Md. 1986), in which
the Maryland District Court dismissed an indictment pursuant to a pre-trial motion
when it found longstanding prosecutorial misconduct in the district. See id. at 1438. The
court recognized the conflict among the circuits regarding the prejudice requirement, see
id. at 1437, but did not take a decisive stand on the issue.
A recent Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. O'Keefe, 825 F.2d 314 (11th Cir.
1987), required a showing of prejudice, but failed to consider that the motion for dismis-
sal had been made prior to trial. See id. at 318. Cf United States v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983) (Norris, J., dissenting in part) (noting that no
case has held that a defendant must demonstrate prejudice before an indictment may be
dismissed pre-trial on supervisory power grounds), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984).
A probable explanation for the scarcity of case law on this point stems from the secrecy
rules governing grand juries. See infra note 43. Usually, a defendant's only access to
grand jury materials is through the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982), which requires
the prosecutor, after direct examination of a witness at trial, to produce the witness' prior
statements. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 80 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This disclo-
sure, therefore, does not take place until after trial has begun. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1982).
The only way a defendant may view the grand jury records prior to trial is to make a
request pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
generally 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 108, at 263-65 (2d ed. 1982)
(disclosure of record to defendant). Courts, however, rarely grant such requests. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wilson, 565 F. Supp. 1416, 1436 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Weinfeld, J.) ("Specu-
lation and surmise" do not substitute for fact and therefore do "not justify disturbing the
traditional secrecy surrounding [grand jury] proceedings."). This inability to view grand
jury records prior to trial makes it almost impossible for a defendant to raise a pre-trial
motion. New York, however, allows inspection of the grand jury minutes by the court
"[u]nless good cause exists to deny the motion to inspect." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 210.30 (McKinney 1982). If the Federal Rules followed New York's lead, this would
save time and resources by unearthing improper procedures at the very beginning of the
proceedings.
11. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986) ("We express no opinion as
to what remedy may be appropriate for a violation... [that] is brought to the attention of
the trial court before the commencement of trial."). The Court has recently granted
certiorari to decide this issue. See Kilpatrick v. United States, 821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No. 87-602).
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peals as to the prejudice requirement. Part IV concludes that federal
courts should grant defendants' pre-trial motions to dismiss indictments
tainted by prosecutorial misconduct without requiring a showing of prej-
udice when the court finds that the misconduct represents a systemic
problem.
I. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PROSECUTOR
AND THE GRAND JURY
In 1166, King Henry II established the grand jury in England to exer-
cise tighter control over the administration of justice throughout his
kingdom.12 This centralization of control diminished the power of both
the church and the feudal lords.I3 The grand jury, as created, existed not
to protect citizens from arbitrary prosecution, but to serve the will of the
king.14 The grand jury did not take on its present role as a "shield for the
innocent against malicious and oppressive prosecution" until 1681, during
the reign of King Charles II11 British colonists transplanted the protec-
tion of the grand jury to America, where it firmly took root. 6 By 1787,
the Framers regarded this procedural safeguard as so essential to citi-
zens' basic liberties that they incorporated it into the fifth amendment of
the Constitution.1
7
The grand jury proceeding functions as an ex parte 8 investigation to
12. See M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial 6 (1975);
Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers to Dismiss a Grand Jury Indictment-A Basis
for Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 1077, 1077-78 (1984). See gener-
ally G. Edwards, The Grand Jury (1906) (general history of the grand jury).
13. See Note, supra note 12, at 1078.
14. See M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 12, at 7; Note, supra note 12, at 1078.
15. See M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 12, at 9. Several developments in grand
jury procedure contributed to the evolution of the grand jury to its current function as a
protector of the people. First, the panel began hearing witnesses in private, thus enabling
it to withstand pressure from the King. See id. at 9-10. Second, when it became apparent
that trial juries were unable to protect the innocent because the King possessed the power
to fine or imprison jurors who voted to acquit, the grand jury filled a necessary vacuum
by refusing to indict innocent persons. See id. at 10. Finally, judges discontinued the
practice of "cross-examining grand jurors about their findings." See id.
16. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956); L. Clark, The Grand Jury
13 (1975); Note, supra note 12, at 1078.
17. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). The fifth amendment of
the Constitution provides in part: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... "
U.S. Const. amend. V. The fifth amendment right to a grand jury applies only to federal
criminal actions; it is not applicable to the states. See C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal
Procedure § 190, at 416 (12th ed. 1974). Each state may choose for itself whether it
wishes to adopt the institution and proceedings of the grand jury. See Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U.S. 516passim (1884). More than half the states have chosen to incorporate the
grand jury as part of their criminal justice system. See Note, supra note 12, at 1078 &
n. 12. The exact structure and format, however, vary from state to state. See M. Frankel
& G. Naftalis, supra note 12, at 19.
18. "Ex parte" is defined as, "done for, in behalf of, or on the application of, one
party only." See Black's Law Dictionary 517 (5th ed. 1979).
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determine whether probable cause19 to institute criminal proceedings
against a person exists;20 it is not an adversarial hearing where the jurors
determine guilt or innocence.2 ' No person may be charged with a felony
unless first indicted by a grand jury.22 In order for a grand jury to deter-
mine whether probable cause to indict exists, grand jurors exercise broad
23investigatory powers, unrestrained by most technical procedural rules
and rules of evidence.24 The prosecutor, as an officer of the court, serves
as the grand jury's legal advisor, 5 aiding, but ideally not directing, the
19. A finding of probable cause means that a fair probability of criminal conduct
exists. See Black's Law Dictionary 1081 (5th ed. 1979). The grand jury must determine
if sufficient evidence exists to warrant putting the subject of an investigation on trial. See
M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 12, at 19.
20. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974). The grand jury
serves the "dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions."
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972). See United States v, DiBernardo, 775
F.2d 1470, 1476 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1948 (1986); see also United
States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir.) (the grand jury prevents the prosecutor
from subjecting innocent people to the trauma of trial), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 187
(1986); United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (grand jury was
established to protect against unfounded government prosecution).
21. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); United States v. Levin-
son, 405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
22. See United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1038 (1982); U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has interpreted the "infa-
mous crime" language contained in the fifth amendment, see supra note 17, to mean a
crime punishable by imprisonment. See Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 352
(1886).
23. The Supreme Court has referred to the grand jury as:
[A] grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the
scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety
or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any
particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
24. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1956); see generally 1 S. Beale
& W. Bryson, supra note 2, at §§ 1:01-1:04 (early history of grand jury). The investiga-
tory powers of the grand jury allow the jurors to compel the testimony of witnesses and
the production of evidence. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
Under the prosecutor's guidance, the grand jury may summon any person before it and
force that witness to disclose everything he knows about the matter under inquiry. See
id. at 343. "The duty to testify [before the grand jury] has long been recognized as a basic
obligation that every citizen owes his Government." Id. at 345; see United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932). If
a witness summoned before the grand jury refuses to appear or refuses to cooperate, the
judge may enter an order commanding compliance. See M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra
note 12, at 20. A witness cannot refuse to answer a question on irrelevancy grounds. See
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). In addition, neither the witness nor the
defendant has the right to have counsel present in the grand jury chamber. See In re
Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957). For a discussion of the breadth of the grand jury
powers, see B. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 2.1, at 2-3 to 2-4 (1987).
25. See Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Un-
due Influence, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 765 (1972); see also infra notes 27-34 and accom-
panying text (description of prosecutor's discretionary grand jury function). Justice
Friendly, in his dissent from United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Friendly, J., dissenting), recognized the dual role of the prosecutor before the grand jury:
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grand jury's determination of probable cause. 6
In her role as advisor, the prosecutor exercises wide discretion in con-
ducting a grand jury proceeding.27 She decides which persons should be
the targets of the investigation 8 and what method of investigation she
will use.29 She requests that the court convene a grand jury,3" obtains
evidence,31 secures witnesses,32 conducts examinations,33 and instructs
the jury on points of law.34 Thus, the prosecutor controls the proceed-
ings and the flow of information. Furthermore, the prosecutor operates
without the check of judge or adversary3 S-no right to cross-examine or
to introduce evidence rebutting the prosecutor's evidence exists for the
accused.36
The prosecutor's discretion, however, has boundaries. She must re-
spect the grand jury's autonomy and therefore may not interfere with its
unbiased judgment.37 In other words, the prosecutor may not act in such
a way as to circumvent the constitutional safeguard provided by the
she must press for the indictment and serve as the grand jury's legal advisor. When a
conflict exists, "the latter duty must take precedence." Id at 628 (citing United States v.
Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 913 (1954)).
26. See D. Nissman & E. Hagen, supra note 5, at 2; Note, supra note 12, at 1079. A
prosecutor must resist the temptation to react emotionally even when a particular crime
enrages the citizenry. See D. Nissman & E. Hagen, supra note 5, at 2. Furthermore, she
must not yield to special interest groups and she must put politics aside. See id. at 5. The
rule the prosecutor must follow is "faithfully to represent the public, strike hard, but be
fair." IL at 11.
27. See generally D. Nissman & E. Hagen, supra note 5, at 2-3 (discussing the power
of the prosecutor in the grand jury proceedings); Gershman, supra note 24, § 2.1, at 2-2.
28. See D. Nissman & E. Hagen, supra note 5, at 13; Gershman, supra note 24, § 2.1,
at 2-2.
29. See B. Gershman, supra note 24, § 2.1, at 2-2. The prosecutor decides "what to
investigate, whom to question, how to interrogate, whom to indict, and how to draft the
indictment." Id; see M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 12, at 21-22.
30. See Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Information,
29 Mich. L. Rev. 403, 414 (1931); Note, supra note 12, at 1079.
Many prosecutors do not seek an indictment unless they personally are convinced that
the suspect has in fact committed the crime. See Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand
Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78
Mich. L. Rev. 463, 500 (1980).
31. Note, supra note 12, at 1079.
32. IL; see Comment, supra note 25, at 766-67.
33. Note, supra note 12, at 1079; Comment, supra note 25, at 766-67.
34. G. Edwards, The Grand Jury 129 (1906); Note, supra note 12, at 1079; see Com-
ment, supra note 25, at 767.
35. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 83 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979); Comment, supra note 25, at
767. A witness is prohibited from having his lawyer accompany him when he testifies
before the grand jury. See M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 12, at 24.
36. See United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 429
U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); see also M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 12, at 24.
37. United States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
3282 (1986); see infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussion of prosecutorial
misconduct).
1987]
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grand jury.38
The lower federal courts have found a wide variety of prosecutorial
actions during a grand jury proceeding to be improper 9.3  These include
inflammatory or prejudicial remarks by the prosecutor intended either to
discredit a witness or to bias the jury;' preindictment publicity substan-
tially generated by the prosecutor;41 use of the grand jury to obtain evi-
dence for another criminal trial or for a civil case;42 and violation of the
grand jury secrecy rules.43 In addition, federal prosecutors must adhere
38. See United States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d at 1404.
39. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text; see generally 2 S. Beale & W.
Bryson, supra note 2, at §§ 10:01-10:12 (surveying types of prosecutorial misconduct);
Jeffress, Dismissal of Indictment for Abuse of the Grand Jury Process, 4 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
Course Mat. J. 57 (April 1980) (same); Note, supra note 12, at 1081 n.36 (same).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 814-15, 818 (3d Cir. 1979) (prose-
cutor asked defendant's brother questions calculated to link defendant to organized
crime); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1352 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (questions and
comments by the prosecutor concerning fact that the corporation had hired a well-known
criminal defense firm suggesting that defendants believed themselves guilty of crimes);
United States v. DiGrazia, 213 F. Supp. 232, 234-35 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (after defendant had
invoked her fifth amendment right to remain silent, prosecutor asked questions "calcu-
lated to discredit and impugn her in eyes of grand jurors"); see generally B. Gershman,
supra note 24, at § 2.3(d) (survey of inflammatory and abusive remarks by prosecutors).
41. Pre-indietment publicity that actually biases the grand jury or publicity substan-
tially generated by the prosecution may constitute grounds for dismissal. See, e.g., Beck
v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 542-46 (1962) (pre-indictment publicity); United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1064-65 (D. Md. 1976) (pre-indictment publicity that gov-
ernment knew of, participated in and welcomed); United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp.
1148, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (pre-indictment publicity), aff'd, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971). Few indictments, however, have been dismissed for
this type of prosecutorial misconduct. See Jeffress, supra note 39, at 67.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Doss, 545 F.2d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 1976) (evidence for
another criminal trial); In re Special March 1974 Grand Jury, 541 F.2d 166, 168 (7th Cir.
1976) (preparation for a civil case), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977); In re Santiago, 533
F.2d 727, 730 (Ist Cir. 1976) (evidence for another criminal trial); Beverly v. United
States, 468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316,
336 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964); United States v. Procter & Gam-
ble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 58 (D.N.J. 1960) (preparation for a civil case).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenfield, 780 F.2d 10, 11-12 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3294 (1986); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1350 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
The secrecy rules are found in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 6(e),
which provides, in part, that "any person to whom disclosure is made . . . shall not
disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these
rules." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2); see generally 2 S. Beale & W. Bryson, supra note 2, at
ch. 7 (discussion of grand jury secrecy rules). The rule, however, allows disclosure to be
made to a government attorney or his assistants by an order of the court or by the court's
permission pursuant to a defendant's request. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3).
Other types of prosecutorial misconduct include undue delay in the presentment of the
indictment, see, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 312 & n.4 (1971); United
States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Quinn, 540 F.2d
357, 361 (8th Cir. 1976); premature signing of the indictment, see, e.g., United States v.
Civella, 666 F.2d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Singer, 660 F.2d 1295, 1302
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp.
1336, 1354-55 (N.D. Ill. 1979); United States v. Tedesco, 441 F. Supp. 1336, 1342 (M.D.
Pa. 1977); and improper use of the subpoena power, see, e.g., United States v. Sears,
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to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Most federal courts, how-
ever, hesitate to exercise their supervisory power to dismiss an indict-
ment tainted by prosecutorial misconduct.45
Prosecutorial misconduct may stem from the two conflicting roles
played by the prosecutor in grand jury proceedings. First, the prosecutor
serves as an officer of the state." As such, she must use her best efforts
to prosecute successfully those who have committed crimes.47 Second,
the prosecutor serves as an officer of the court.48 In this capacity, she
must advise the grand jury without influencing its determination.49 In
other words, the prosecutor acts on her own conclusion that probable
cause exists to bring a person to trial, yet she must avoid compelling the
grand jury to accept this conclusion.
II. THE FEDERAL COURTS' USE OF THEIR SUPERVISORY POWER
The federal courts possess an inherent power to supervise the adminis-
tration of justice in order to establish and maintain civilized standards of
Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1390 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1079
(1984). This list also includes conflict of interest, see ag., United States v. Gold, 470 F.
Supp. at 1346, 1350-51; United States v. Braniff Airways, 428 F. Supp. 579, 583 (W.D.
Tex. 1977); where prosecutor testifies as a witness and then remains in the grand jury
room as the presenting attorney, see, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 551
(3d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. at
1351; United States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959, 962 (N.D. Tex. 1978). In addition,
courts have found the following to constitute prosecutorial misconduct: knowing use of
pejured testimony, see, e.g., United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 348-49 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d
781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 315 (D. Conn. 1975);
and an atmosphere produced by the prosecutor which suggests intimidation and reckless
disregard of the "postulates of a fair trial," United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d at 349.
44. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1986) (a violation of Rule 6(d)
justifies dismissal of portions of an indictment if actual prejudice has resulted).
45. See, e.g., United States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.) (supervisory
power "mandates judicial concern for the independence of the prosecutor and the grand
jury"), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3282 (1986); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 942
(6th Cir. 1984) (courts should exercise supervisory power sparingly), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1193 (1985); United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1979) (use of
supervisory power to dismiss is "frequently discussed and rarely invoked"); United States
v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1437-38 (D. Md. 1986) (courts should exercise
supervisory power sparingly).
46. See Comment, supra note 25, at 765; see also supra notes 27-34 and accompanying
text (description of prosecutor's discretionary grand jury function).
47. The Supreme Court has defined a prosecutor as:
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sover-
eignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
48. See Comment, supra note 25, at 765; see also supra notes 27-34 and accompanying
text (description of prosecutor's discretionary grand jury function).
49. See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly,
C.J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 25, at 765; see also supra notes 25-26 (role of
prosecutor as legal advisor).
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procedure and justice.5 ° Supervisory powers exist to protect a defend-
ant's basic rights,5" to deter illegal conduct, 52 and to protect judicial in-
tegrity.53 A federal court may exercise its supervisory power to
formulate, within limits, procedural rules not specifically required by the
Constitution or Congress.5 4 A court may enforce these rules with appro-
priate sanctions, including the sanction of dismissal.5 Therefore,
although use of the supervisory power to dismiss an indictment does not
require a constitutional violation,56 the federal courts may use their su-
pervisory power to dismiss cases in which such a violation has
occurred. 7
50. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); see United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727, 734-35 & n.7 (1980); Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963) (per
curiam); Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 483
F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1973); Helwig v. United States, 162 F.2d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 1947).
51. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); United States v. Omni
Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1436 (D. Md. 1986).
52. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727, 744 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d
334, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975); United States v.
Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1436 (D. Md. 1986).
53. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); United States v. Adamo,
742 F.2d 927, 942 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); United States v.
McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975);
United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1436 (D. Md. 1986).
54. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943); United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No. 87-602).
In United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 436
U.S. 31 (1978), the Second Circuit held that strike force attorneys must follow the same
practice as the local United States Attorneys in giving warnings to target witnesses, even
though such warnings were not constitutionally required. Id. at 778.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 75 (1986) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. granted,
56 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No. 87-602); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d
927, 942 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); United States v. Mitchell,
572 F. Supp. 709, 713 (N.D. Calif. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983) (pursuant to
the court's supervisory power, dismissal is justified "to prevent prosecutorial impairment
of the grand jury's independent role"); United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp.
1414, 1440 (D. Md. 1986) (dismissal of indictment for flagrant prosecutorial misconduct).
Courts exercise their supervisory power to deter illegality and to protect judicial integrity,
not solely as a method of protecting a defendant's basic rights. See supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text.
57. The federal courts sometimes use their supervisory power as an alternative to
dismissal based upon a constitutional violation. See United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d
1456, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987) (court may dismiss indictment on basis of fifth amendment
due process or grand jury clauses or by relying on its supervisory power), cert. granted, 56
U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No. 87-602); United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d
1306, 1309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). Most of the lower court deci-
sions employing supervisory authority have not involved constitutional violations. See
Beale, supra note 3, at 1460. In United States v. Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976),
the Second Circuit dismissed an indictment pursuant to its supervisory power. The
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976)." United States v. Jacobs, 429 U.S. 909
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In United States v. Hasting,58 the Supreme Court held that the federal
courts may exercise their supervisory power to correct prosecutorial mis-
conduct when its use would remedy a violation of a defendant's recog-
nized rights, preserve judicial integrity, or deter illegal or improper
conduct.59 The Court held that to further these underlying purposes, a
federal court faced with prosecutorial misconduct should balance the
need to discipline the prosecutor against the need for the prompt admin-
istration of justice and the interest of crime victims before it agrees to
dismiss an indictment pursuant to its inherent supervisory power.60
The Hasting Court reinstated a conviction overturned by the Seventh
Circuit for technical violations of the defendant's fifth amendment
rights. 61 Although the Supreme Court found that the prosecutor had
acted improperly during trial summation,62 it reversed the Court of Ap-
peals decision because it found the harm of the prosecutor's misconduct
to be outweighed by the substantial costs of a retrial 3.6  Hasting, there-
fore, stands for the proposition that courts need not dismiss per se an
indictment tainted by prosecutorial misconduct."r It does not, however,
establish a prejudice requirement; 6 it merely requires a court to
"balanc[e] the interests involved." 66
In addition to the balancing test required by Hasting, lower federal
courts have considered several other factors as limits on the exercise of
their supervisory power to dismiss an indictment. Initially, courts accord
grand jury proceedings a presumption of regularity. 67 As a result, a de-
(1976). On remand, the Second Circuit affirmed its previous decision because it recog-
nized that while Mandujano had been a constitutional decision, this indictment had been
dismissed based upon the court's supervisory power. United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d
772, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court then dismissed the writ of certiorari as
"improvidently granted." United States v. Jacobs, 436 U.S. 31 (1978).
58. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
59. See id. at 505.
60. See id at 509.
61. See id at 512.
62. See id at 512. While, strictly speaking, Hasting deals with trial dismissal based
upon a court's general supervisory power, courts frequently have cited it in reference to
dismissal of indictments for prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury. See, eg., United
States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754, 759 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d
1456, 1477 (10th Cir. 1987) (Seymour, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3459
(U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No. 87-602); United States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3282 (1986).
63. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983). The Court recognized
that a retrial infringes upon society's interests in the prompt administration of justice and
protecting victims from unnecessarily having to relive their experience. See id at 507.
64. See id at 506-07 (reversals of convictions must be approached with a "view to-
ward balancing the interests involved" (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734
(1980))).
65. See Note, supra note 12, at 1087.
66. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 507 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734
(1980)).
67. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). "Presumption of regular-
ity" means that, upon review, federal courts must presume that the conduct of both the
prosecutor and the grand jurors was proper. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66,
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fendant bears a heavy burden of proving that the prosecutor acted im-
properly during the grand jury proceedings.68 Furthermore, the
judiciary, to preserve the independence of the prosecutor and the grand
jury, must give deference to their independent decisions to indict the de-
fendant. 69 Finally, the courts must look to the availability of other, lesser
sanctions7" before they agree to dismiss an indictment upon a showing of
prosecutorial misconduct.7"
In United States v. Mechanik,72 the Supreme Court applied the Hast-
ing balancing test to reverse a Fourth Circuit decision to dismiss an in-
dictment and conviction founded on a prosecutor's violation in a grand
jury proceeding of one of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.73 In
reaching this result, the Supreme Court held that the petit jury's 74 guilty
verdict rendered harmless any error in the grand jury proceeding 75 and
that to dismiss the indictment after conviction would entail excessive so-
cial and economic costs. 76 The Court, in dictum, stated that a defendant
may justify these costs if he can show that the misconduct prejudiced his
case in some way.77 The Court left open the question of the appropriate
standard for dismissal of an indictment when, prior to trial, a defendant
moves to dismiss on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct during grand
75 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); United States v. Kouba, 822 F.2d 768, 774 (8th
Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Hintzman, 806 F.2d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 1986));
United States v. Lamoureux, 711 F.2d 745, 747 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Borello,
624 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Myers, 510 F. Supp. 323, 326
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
68. See United States v. Lamoureux, 711 F.2d 745, 747 (6th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Borello, 624 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
69. See United States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3282 (1986); United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 825 (1977); Beale, supra note 3, at 1457 n.169.
70. These lesser sanctions include a request by the court for an investigation by the
Attorney General into the prosecutorial misconduct, see United States v. Myers, 5 10 F.
Supp. 323, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); holding the prosecutor in contempt of court, see United
States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); and admonishing the prosecutor,
see United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Vetere,
663 F. Supp. at 386.
71. See United States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3282 (1986); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1395 (Norris, J.,
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984).
72. 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
73. See id. at 69-70 (joint testimony of two federal agents before grand jury violated
Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
74. A petit jury is the ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action. Black's
Law Dictionary 768 (5th ed. 1979). A grand jury, by contrast, is a jury of inquiry whose
duties consist of determining whether probable cause that a crime has been committed
exists and whether an indictment should be returned for such a crime. Id.
75. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70.
76. See id. at 72. The Court noted that reversing a conviction entails substantial so-
cial costs that include forcing jurors, witnesses, the courts, the prosecutor and any de-
fendants to expend further time and resources to repeat a trial; asking victims to relive





III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS' CONFLICTING VIEWS
ON WHETHER DISMISSAL REQUIRES A
SHOWING OF PREJUDICE
Although Hasting sets out the factors relevant to a district court's de-
cision to exercise its supervisory power,79 each court of appeals that has
considered these factors has accorded each different weight."m The
weight a federal court accords to the various factors relevant to its deci-
sion to exercise its supervisory power determines whether it will require a
defendant to demonstrate prejudice before it will dismiss an indictment
tainted by prosecutorial misconduct.8 ' Much controversy exists among
the courts as to whether dismissal of an indictment pursuant to the su-
pervisory power requires a showing of prejudice.8 2 Courts that reason
that the primary purpose of dismissal is only to remedy a wrong done to
a particular defendant require a showing of prejudice.8 3 Those circuits
that focus upon the need for systemic deterrence of prosecutorial miscon-
duct, however, will also base their decision to dismiss on the need to
preserve judicial integrity, rather than solely on the presence or absence
of prejudice to the defendant.8 4
78. Id The Court has granted certiorari to decide this issue. See Kilpatrick v.
United States, 821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan.
12, 1988) (No. 87-602).
79. Federal courts may use their supervisory power to remedy a violation of a recog-
nized right, to preserve judicial integrity, and to deter illegal conduct. See United States
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983). But cf United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755
(1979) (where no violation of the Constitution or a federal rule occurs, the Court does not
adopt a rigid exclusionary rule).
80. Compare infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text with infra notes 119, 120-22
and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Talbot, 825 F.2d 991, 998 (6th Cir. 1987) (dismissal
only upon a showing of actual prejudice), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3500 (1988); United
States v. Kouba, 822 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. McKenzie,
678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.) (indictment constitutes merely a preliminary step; safeguards
associated with trial will protect defendant), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1394-95 (9th Cir.
1983) (Norris, J., dissenting in part) (primary goal of supervisory power is the "protec-
tion of systemic values by deterring official misconduct and preserving the appearance of
fairness"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984); United States v. Thibadeau, 671 F.2d 75, 78
(2d Cir. 1982) (dismissal will maintain proper prosecutorial standards); United States v.
Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979) (dismissal is only effective way to encourage
prosecutorial compliance with ethical standards); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d
334, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (dismissal maintains respect for the law), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 930 (1975); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Hufstedler, J., concurring) (an important function of supervisory power is to guarantee
that prosecutors "act with due regard for the integrity of the administration of justice").
Still other courts of appeals have recognized the conflict among the circuits, without
establishing their own standard for dismissal. For example, while the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has not spoken clearly on the prejudice issue, district courts in the
1987]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The decision in United States v. Hogan8 provides an example of a
court that focuses upon the need for systemic deterrence of prosecutorial
misconduct. In Hogan, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dis-
missed an indictment despite a lack of prejudice to the defendant because
it found the actions of the prosecutor to have impaired the independent
role of the grand jury.86 The court found several instances of
prosecutorial misconduct, including characterization of the defendant as
a "real hoodlum"87 and the presentation of extensive hearsay
testimony.88
In Hogan and other Second Circuit cases, dismissal of an indictment
has been justified to achieve either of two objectives: to eliminate preju-
dice to the individual defendant,89 or to prevent widespread prosecutorial
impairment of the grand jury's independent role.90 The latter objective is
based upon the desire to enforce appropriate behavior by the government
in presenting evidence to the grand jury.91 In other words, dismissal of
an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct acts to deter future miscon-
duct.92 The need for this deterrence justifies the extreme sanction of
dismissal.
Similarly, other circuit courts have held the defendant to a lesser stan-
dard by looking beyond the individual defendant and instead focusing on
Fourth Circuit have recognized the split among the circuits over this issue and have
agreed to dismiss indictments where they find prosecutorial misconduct to be a long-
standing practice in the district. See United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp.
1414, 1438 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 169-70 (D. Md.
1980).
The Seventh Circuit also has recognized the split among the courts of appeals on the
issue of prejudice, but, it too has not taken a position. In United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d
1200 (7th Cir. 1985), the court noted with approval the requirement that the
prosecutorial misconduct be outrageous or intentional, but left open the issue of preju-
dice. See id. at 1205.
85. 712 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983).
86. See id. at 761.
87. See id.
88. See id. Use of hearsay evidence alone, however, is not a valid cause for dismissal.
See Note, supra note 12, at 1081 n.36. To ensure that probable cause to indict the defend-
ant exists, however, courts should avoid allowing undue reliance upon hearsay. See
United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972) (prosecutor must not deceive
grand jurors as to the "shoddy merchandise they are getting") (quoting United States v.
Payton, 363 F.2d 996, 1000 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 993 (1966)).
89. See United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d at 761; United States v. Borello, 624 F.
Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
90. See United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d at 761; United States v. Ciambrone, 601
F.2d 616, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 648 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 778 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978); United States v. Borello, 624 F. Supp. 150, 153
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); see also United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D. Conn. 1975).
91. See United States v. Bai, 750 F.2d 1169, 1176 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1019 (1985); United States v. Thibadeau, 671 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Broward, 594 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); United
States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972).
92. See United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d at 1137.
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the integrity of the grand jury system.93 The rationales for this approach
include the realization that dismissal of an indictment may help maintain
proper prosecutorial standards;94 that dismissal does not really hurt the
government because it may reindict;" that dismissal maintains respect
for the law, promotes confidence in the administration of justice and
"preserve[s] the judicial process from contamination;" 96 and that other
sanctions have proved ineffective. 97
This "no prejudice" position represents the federal courts' apprecia-
tion of the realities of the grand jury system. The lack of restraints on a
prosecutor 98 enables her to abuse her special relationship with the grand
jury.99 Such abuse places a defendant at enormous risk because an in-
dictment itself, even if followed by acquittal, can have a devastating im-
pact on the defendant's professional and personal life." co Thus, a number
of courts have pointed out that continued prosecutorial misconduct im-
poses substantial costs on individual citizens and society as a whole.' 0 '
They believe that the judiciary must protect against even the appearance
of unfairness.10 2 These courts, however, reserve the use of the sanction
93. Seea eg., United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979) (costs of con-
tinued prosecutorial misconduct are substantial); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334,
349 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (dismissal preserves the judicial process from contamina-
tion), cert denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975).
94. See United States v. Thibadeau, 671 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Broward, 594 F.2d 345, 351
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137
(2d Cir. 1972).
95. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1896); United States v. Estepa,
471 F.2d at 1137; United States v. Beltram, 388 F.2d 449, 453 (21 Cir.) (Medina, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 955 (1968); United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F.
Supp. 1414, 1440 (D. Md. 1986).
96. United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled
on other grounds, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)), cerL denied, 421 U.S. 930
(1975).
97. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1979) ("judicial
'tongue clicking'" has had little impact on the problem); United States v. Estepa, 471
F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972) (admonishing the prosecutors has proven fruitless);
United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissent-
ing) (if courts disapprove of government conduct but continue to refuse to reverse, the
"deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such occasions are purely ceremonial"),
cert denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
98. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; supra note 43.
99. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 83 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979).
100. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979).
101. In his Mechanik dissent, Justice Marshall noted that "refusal to reverse convic-
tions for demonstrated grand jury misconduct . . . imposes unacceptable costs."
Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 83 (Marshall, J., dissenting); accord United States v. Serubo, 604
F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 350 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (en bane), cert denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975).
102. See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983)
(Norris, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984); United States v.
Serubo, 604 F.2d at 817.
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of dismissal for relatively serious instances of misconduct. 103
In contrast to the "no prejudice" position taken by the several courts
of appeals, other circuit courts focus on the individual defendant and
refuse to dismiss an indictment pursuant to their supervisory power with-
out a showing of prejudice-that is, that the grand jury's decision to in-
dict actually was based upon the prosecutorial misconduct.'"
For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. McKenzie 05 reinstated a grand jury indictment when it failed to
find that the prosecutor's misconduct prejudiced the defendant. 0 6
Although the court recognized the prosecutor's misleading response to
the juror's questions about jury voting procedure to be egregious miscon-
duct,° 7 it did not find that this misconduct had biased the grand jurors'
determination of probable cause.1"8 The court defined prejudicial mis-
conduct as conduct that effectively superimposes the will of the prosecu-
tor on the grand jury.1" 9
The McKenzie court rationalized its prejudice requirement by stating
that an indictment represents a preliminary step in the proceedings
against a defendant. 1 ' Under this view, a court relies on the safeguards
associated with a trial to ensure that the defendant is not convicted im-
properly.III Other circuits have deemed prejudice to be a necessary ele-
ment of prosecutorial misconduct itself,"2 or have found prosecutorial
misconduct to constitute harmless error in the absence of prejudice. " 3
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has adopted a hybrid ap-
103. See United States v. Thibadeau, 671 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1982) ("the sanction is
reserved for 'very limited and extreme circumstances'" (quoting United States v. Brow-
ard, 594 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979))); accord United States
v. Baskes, 433 F. Supp. 799, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (dismissal may be appropriate where the
government itself "instigate[s] or provide[s] essential assistance to illegal behavior");
United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1438 (D. Md. 1986) (dismissal
appropriate to combat government's longstanding practice of creating and altering
documents).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Kouba, 822 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3459
(U.S. Jan. 12, 1988) (No. 87-602); United States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3282 (1986); United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1249
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985); United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629,
631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
105. 678 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
106. Id. at 633-34.
107. Id. at 633; cf United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Friendly, J., dissenting) ("when a grand juror requests advice, the prosecutor may not
fence with him but must respond fully and fairly").
108. McKenzie, 678 F.2d at 633.
109. Id. at 631.
110. Id.
111. See id.; accord Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968)
("the greatest safeguard to the liberty of the accused is the petit jury"), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1022 (1971).
112. See United States v. O'Keefe, 825 F.2d 314, 318 (1lth Cir. 1987).
113. See United States v. Kouba, 822 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Carr, 764 F.2d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1986).
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proach under which it will not dismiss an indictment unless to do so will
both protect the individual defendant and serve to deter manifest sys-
temic misconduct.114 For example, United States v. Talbot I,5 holds that
a defendant is entitled to the "extreme sanction" of dismissal only when
he can prove that the misconduct prejudiced him and that the
prosecutorial misconduct constitutes a longstanding or common abuse in
the district.' 16 The Sixth Circuit has offered the strong public interest in
prosecuting serious crimes as its rationale for this onerous standard."I7
The circuits that require a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant
fail to address the realities of the grand jury system"I and the failure of
less drastic sanctions to curb prosecutorial misconduct.' 9 Instead, they
focus strictly on the individual defendant, failing to recognize the sys-
temic dangers involved in allowing prosecutorial misconduct to continue
unchecked. While a strong public interest in prosecuting serious crimes
certainly exists,'2 these circuits fail to consider the equally strong public
interest in preserving judicial integrity. 2' Furthermore, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's almost unattainable requirement of both prejudice to the defendant
and a systemic problem of prosecutorial misconduct'" renders the rules
of conduct virtually unenforceable and the supervisory power impotent.
Thus, the relative value a court attributes to each of the factors con-
tained in the Hasting balancing test will determine whether it will require
a showing of prejudice. Courts that require prejudice allot more weight
to society's interest in efficiently prosecuting serious crimes than to the
wrong done to the individual defendant.'23 Under this standard, if the
prosecutorial misconduct did not bias the grand jury, the court will find
that the wrong done to the defendant is de minimis and does not justify
dismissal.'24 Courts that dismiss an indictment without requiring a
114. See United States v. Talbot, 825 F.2d 991, 998 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56
U.S.L.W. 3500 (1988); United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 941-42 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985).
115. 825 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3500 (1988).
116. Id at 998-99 n.5. The alleged grand jury abuses included a violation of double
jeopardy, speedy trial and due process rights. See id. at 996.
117. See United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 941 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1193 (1985); United States v. Nembhard, 676 F.2d 193, 200 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
118. These courts fail to recognize the existence of grand jury abuse. See supra notes
39-44 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of lesser
sanctions).
120. See United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
837 (1985); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 941 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1193 (1985).
121. See supra notes 84, 100-02 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
124. See United States v. Kouba, 822 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Carr, 764 F.2d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986); United States
v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
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showing of prejudice, however, allot more weight to society's interest in
preserving the grand jury system as a protection against malicious or
unfounded prosecution than to society's interest in efficiently prosecuting
serious crimes. 125 According to these courts, prosecutorial misconduct
itself usurps a basic constitutional right, 126 justifying the dismissal of a
tainted indictment, even at the expense of judicial economy. 127
IV. DISMISSAL WITHOUT A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE WHEN THE
DEFENDANT RAISES THE ISSUE OF PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT IN A PRE-TRIAL MOTION
As stated previously, the Supreme Court has left open the question of
the appropriate standard for dismissal when the defendant raises the is-
sue of prosecutorial misconduct in a pre-trial motion. 128 Few courts have
confronted this "pre-trial" issue.129 Those circuits that do not require a
showing of prejudice when the defendant raises the issue during or after
trial,' along with dissenting opinions of those courts that do, 13' provide
insight into how courts should handle pre-trial motions for dismissal-by
focusing on the system rather than just the individual defendant. 132
Under the Hasting balancing test, the minimal cost imposed on the judi-
cial system and on the victim by reindictment before trial 133 militates in
favor of dismissal without a showing of prejudice when dismissal would
serve to deter prosecutorial misconduct. This will preserve the integrity
of the grand jury process and, through it, that of the entire federal crimi-
nal justice system.134
A. Balancing Relevant Interests
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Hasting, a federal court must
conduct a balancing test prior to exercising its supervisory power to dis-
miss a tainted indictment. 135  When a defendant raises the issue of
125. See supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
126. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 86 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972).
128. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72.
129. See supra note 10.
130. See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 83 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (refusal to reverse
convictions for demonstrated grand jury misconduct imposes unacceptable costs on soci-
ety); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983) (Norris,
J., dissenting in part) ("No case has held ... that a defendant must show that a grandjury is biased before an indictment may be dismissed pretrial on supervisory power
grounds."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984).
132. See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
134. See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983)(Norris, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984); United States v. Mc-
Cord, 509 F.2d 334, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975).
See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 59-60 & 66 and accompanying text.
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prosecutorial misconduct before trial, application of the Hasting balanc-
ing test136 favors dismissal of a tainted indictment as a means of protect-
ing both the defendant's and society's interests in preserving fifth
amendment rights.
Courts must consider various factors before agreeing to dismiss.
When a motion is made during or after a trial on the merits, among the
factors to be weighed is the trauma a victim will incur by reliving his
experience at a second trial.13 7 Another factor to be considered is judi-
cial and prosecutorial economy-keeping the time and money involved
in prosecuting a crime to a minimum.'38 A third factor is the strong
public interest in prosecuting serious crimes. 39 In light of these consid-
erations, which emphasize economy of resources, courts will be less in-
clined to dismiss an indictment after society and the victim have invested
resources in a trial.
When a defendant moves to dismiss prior to trial, however, the factors
relevant to a court's decision to dimiss balance in favor of dismissal.
Prior to trial the victim has not testified under cross-examination in an
open court room.' n The trauma to the victim caused by testifying at a
reindictment proceeding, thus, is less severe. Furthermore, a grand jury
proceeding involves a much smaller expenditure of time and money than
does a full trial.'"I Therefore, if the government should choose to seek a
second, untainted indictment, the nominal expenses already incurred
should not act as a deterrent to its doing so. In a pre-trial motion, the
Hasting balancing favors dismissal: society's interest in the preservation
of the grand jury system and the protection of the defendant outweigh
the minimal costs of a second grand jury proceeding.
Finally, dismissal will not hamper the societal interest in prosecuting
serious crimes. When a court dismisses an indictment pursuant to its
supervisory power, the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
does not apply,'42 and the government is free to reindict.' 43 Therefore,
136. See supra notes 59-60.
137. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986); United States v. Hasting,
461 U.S. 499, 507.
138. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72.
139. See id at 77.
140. As stated previously, the grand jury proceeding is ex parte. See supra note 18.
No defense attorney is present to try to discredit the victim or other witnesses through
cross-examination. See supra notes 74 & 89.
141. Cf United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72 (discussing expenses of retrial).
142. The fifth amendment provides in part that no person shall "be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... U.S. Coast. amend. V.
Double jeopardy, however, does not apply to grand jury proceedings. See Note, supra
note 12, at 1098 & n.170. Rather, jeopardy attaches only after a petit jury has been em-
paneled and sworn. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734passim (1963).
143. "The decision to resubmit a case to a grand jury is a matter of prosecutorial
discretion that generally is not subject to judicial scrutiny." Note, supra note 12, at 1098
n.170; see United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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dismissal does not infringe substantially upon society's interest in prose-
cuting serious crimes.
Thus, the costs of dismissing an indictment pursuant to a pre-trial mo-
tion weigh little in the Hasting balance; the costs of continued
prosecutorial misconduct, on the other hand, should tip the balance in
favor of dismissal.'" Continued prosecutorial misconduct threatens to
destroy the grand jury's role as a "shield for the innocent." '145 Such mis-
conduct not only violates the fifth amendment, 146 but also threatens the
integrity of the entire criminal justice system.
1. Deterrence
Courts afford the grand jury a presumption of regularity 47 and should
respect a prosecutor's independence. 148 The prosecutor, however, pos-
sesses both the opportunity and the incentive to engage in misconduct
during a grand jury proceeding.' 49 In addition, the secrecy rules shield
the prosecutor from public scrutiny. 5 ° With little restraint upon her ac-
tions, an overzealous federal prosecutor may, in any given case, convert
the grand jury into a coercive arm of the United States Attorney's Of-
fice. 51 To preserve the grand jury's role as a protector against un-
founded prosecution, the courts must prevent such misconduct.
Courts can achieve this goal by granting pre-trial motions to dismiss
prosecutor-influenced indictments without a showing of prejudice. Dis-
missal of indictments tainted by prosecutorial misconduct will deter fu-
ture misconduct and preserve judicial integrity. 52  Dismissing
indictments results in a systemic inefficiency to which the United States
Attorneys must respond by curbing instances of misconduct. 5 3 As with
the exclusionary rule,' 5 4 the benefit to the individual defendant repre-
144. In his dissent from the Mechanik decision, Justice Marshall stated that
"[c]ontrary to the majority's suggestion that reversal is too costly a remedy for grand jury
misconduct, it is the majority's refusal to reverse convictions for demonstrated grand jury
misconduct that imposes unacceptable costs." United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66,
83 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
145. Note, supra note 12, at 1078. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 27-36, 99 and accompanying text. As Judge Learned Hand wrote
thirty-five years ago, "[s]ave for torture, it would be hard to find a more effective tool of
tyranny than the power of unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination." United
States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 913 (1954).
150. See supra note 43.
151. See United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
152. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1979); supra notes 92,
94, 96 and accompanying text.
153. See United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 1978) (dismissal will "help
to translate assurances of the United States Attorneys into consistent performances by
their assistants"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
154. The fourth amendment provides the basis of the exclusionary rule: evidence ob-
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sents only an incidental by-product of the primary goal of protecting sys-
temic values by deterring official misconduct and preserving the
"appearance of fairness."' 55 Without deterrence, a real danger exists
that the grand jury will deteriorate to serving as a "rubber stamp" of the
prosecutor. 156 If this were to occur, the grand jury would no longer serve
its fifth amendment purpose as a means of protecting the innocent from
unfounded prosecution.' 57
When raised pre-trial, prosecutorial misconduct during grand jury
proceedings also necessitates dismissal because lesser sanctions have
proven unsuccessful in curbing such misconduct.'58 Courts have recog-
nized that admonishing the prosecutor fails to ensure the maintenance of
prosecutorial standards.' 59 Although the United States Attorney's of-
fices have implemented policies to curb misconduct, '" they have failed
to translate the resulting policies into proper conduct by their trial prose-
cutors. 16 1 Furthermore, although professional disciplinary sanctions ex-
ist,162 a criminal defendant generally lacks the resources to initiate
proceedings "or to see that they are pressed to a successful conclu-
sion."' 63 Dismissal, although extreme, appears to be the only sanction
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure violates the fourth amendment, and thus,
must be excluded from trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). This is a court-
made rule whose "prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). Where, however, a police
officer seeks out a neutral magistrate to obtain a search warrant and acts within its scope,
errors by the police officer will be forgiven as part of a "good faith exception." United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 passim (1984).
155. See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983)
(Norris, J., dissenting in part), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984); accord United States v.
McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cerL denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975);
United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissent-
ing), cerL denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
156. See United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Moley, supra note 30, at 414.
157. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 97.
159. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co.,
155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946);
United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
160. See United States v. Arcuri, 405 F.2d 691, 693 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing United States
v. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp. 347, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)); cerL denied, 395 U.S. 913 (1969)).
The most prominent internal guidelines governing prosecutorial misconduct are the
United States Attorneys' Manual. See 2 S. Beale & W. Bryson, supra note 2, § 10:21, at
78. The manual, however, is "intended to provide only internal guidance, and 'is not
intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.'" Id. at 78-
79 (citing United States Attorneys' Manual § 1-1.100).
161. See United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972).
162. See generally Gershman, supra note 24, at § 13.6 (reviewing various sanctions).
163. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 818 (3d Cir. 1979). In Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor enjoys abso-
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that will successfully prevent future abuse of the grand jury system.'64
2. Technicalities
Critics have expressed concern that permitting lower courts to throw
out indictments without a showing of prejudice will allow dismissals
based on isolated technicalities.165 Federal courts will avoid this problem
if they adhere to the dual purpose of dismissal: to protect the rights of an
individual defendant 166 and to deter prosecutorial misconduct that is re-
curring or wide-spread within a district.167 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Serubo 168 sheds light on how
these purposes should affect the decision of whether or not to dismiss.
In Serubo, the Third Circuit panel held that a court should dismiss an
indictment only if it finds at least one of three situations present:
prosecutorial misconduct which actually prejudiced the grand jury's de-
cision to indict; 169 conduct amounting to more than "an isolated incident
unmotivated by sinister ends;"' 7° or a type of misconduct which has be-
come "entrenched and flagrant". 7 '
lute immunity from civil suit over activities that are an integral part of the judicial pro-
cess. See id. at 427. The Court reached this decision despite the fact that after ten years
of litigation, eight years of imprisonment, and a death sentence, the Federal District
Court for the Central District of California found eight instances of misconduct at Im-
bler's trial. See id. at 414-15; see also Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1967) ("bloody
shorts" offered into evidence at trial were actually paint stained).
164. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1979) (dismissal will
"produce a sharp improvement in the procedures adopted by United States Attorneys to
control attorney conduct before the grand jury"); United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp.
381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (exercise of supervisory powers will encourage fair and uniform
procedures in the prosecution of a criminal action).
165. If every error justified dismissing an indictment, grand jury proceedings would be
"sidetracked by insignificant technicalities." Note, supra note 12, at 1097; see Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
166. See United States v. Kouba, 822 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 647
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Borello, 624 F. Supp.
150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); supra note 89.
167. See United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
837 (1985); United States v. Broward, 594 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
941 (1979); United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1438 (D. Md. 1986);
supra note 90.
168. 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979). A recent Third Circuit case may have called into
question the circuit's standards for dismissal of indictments for prosecutorial misconduct
in the grand jury. In United States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1987), the court, in
dicta, stated that in "every case we looked to prejudice." Id. at 759. The court went on
to say, however, that it was not reaching the issue of prejudice because there had been no
finding of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 762 & n.6. Serubo, therefore, would appear to
retain its vitality.
169. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979).
170. Id. (quoting United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 559 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980)).
171. Id. (quoting United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 559 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980)).
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Serubo's first requirement protects the rights of the individual defend-
ant. The fifth amendment presupposes that the grand jury will operate as
an independent investigative body. 172 If the prosecutor usurps this inde-
pendence by biasing the grand jury through her misconduct, the resulting
indictment will violate the individual defendant's fifth amendment
rights.
1 73
The latter two Serubo requirements protect the integrity of the grand
jury process. When the defendant shows an instance of prosecutorial
misconduct to involve more than an isolated mistake made in good
faith,174 or when the defendant shows that such misconduct has become
the normal practice among the local Assistant United States Attor-
neys, 175 preservation of the integrity of the system mandates that the
courts adopt the harshest sanction available to them: they must dismiss
the tainted indictment, regardless of whether the misconduct prejudiced
the outcome of the grand jury proceeding.
Thus, application of the Serubo test will ensure that courts will not
dismiss indictments for de minimis technical violations. In addition, it
will further the federal courts' interest in preserving judicial integrity and
the integrity of the entire criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION
The use of the federal courts' supervisory powers to dismiss an indict-
ment presents the most effective way to curb prosecutorial misconduct at
the grand jury level. When a defendant raises the issue of misconduct
before trial, the court should dismiss without requiring the defendant to
show prejudice if dismissal would serve to deter a systemic problem of
prosecutorial misconduct.
Using the balancing test required by United States v. Hasting, societal
interests favor dismissal when the defendant raises the issue in a pre-trial
motion. No long and costly trial has occurred, no victims have testified
172. The fifth amendment guarantee presupposes an investigative body "acting inde-
pendently of either the prosecuting attorney or judge." Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S.
212, 218 (1960). See United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631-32 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
173. See supra note 17; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973) (compelled
production of voice exemplars); United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir.)
(prosecutor's misleading response to a juror's question), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
174. Courts have been faced with a variety of isolated incidents of prosecutorial mis-
conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenfield, 780 F.2d 10, 11 (3d Cir. 1985) (violation of
grand jury secrecy rules), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3294 (1986); United States v. Roth, 777
F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985) (use of perjured evidence); United States v. Serubo, 604
F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979) (improper use of subpoena power).
175. See, eg., United States v. Rosenfield, 780 F.2d 10, 11 (3d Cir. 1985) (violation of
grand jury secrecy rules), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3294 (1986); United States v. Griffith,
756 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir.) (improper comment by prosecutor regarding defendant's
right to testify), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985); Serubo, 604 F.2d at 817 (improper use
of subpoena power); United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1438 (D. Md.
1986) (alteration and creation of documents).
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under cross-examination, and no supervening jury verdict has been
handed down. On the other hand, the costs of unchecked prosecutorial
misconduct may be substantial.
The Framers incorporated the grand jury system into the Constitution
to protect citizens from unfounded government prosecution. Some in-
stances of prosecutorial misconduct, however, have transformed individ-
ual grand juries into tools of the United States Attorneys' Offices. The
rules of secrecy, the absence of judge or adversary, and the wide discre-
tion granted to the prosecutor make the grand jury fertile ground for
misconduct. Other, lesser sanctions have proven ineffective. If the
courts allow misconduct to continue unchecked, they risk undermining
the integrity of the entire criminal justice system.
Lisa H. Wallach
